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I.
To date, there has been too scant a recognition of the fertile possi-
bilities in the study of primitive law for the study of law in general.
In consequence, the ethnology of law has been to a considerable extent
a field of neglected opportunity for the anthropologist and student of
law alike. Students of law, enchanted with the intricate mazes of their
stately formal garden, have generally looked on the field of primitive
lawoas an undomesticated and infertile wilderness. The prevailing pat-
tern is to deny the existence of law in societies which succeed in settling
disputes and claims without benefit of courts.' This parochial point of
view has been to a great extent so successfully impressed upon anthr.i-
pologists that only a very few have even attempted to give consideration
to the legal materials which might exist in primitive societies. Anthr,,-
pology, as a science, is unequipped with exploratory tools and methi d.s-
logical techniques for apprehending and handling the social facts which
pertain to law and legal problems in primitive societies. In consequence,
the science has had little to offer lawmen to date. It is as a monument
to this fact that Sir Henry Maine's Ancient Lazzw2 still remains after
eight decades the preeminent work on the origin and nature sf primitive
legal institutions. This is true even though Maine wrote at a time when
knowledge of primitive society was meagre and faulty, to say the least,
and Sir Henry was concerned not so much with primitive law as with
the "archaic" law of classical antiquity. In view of the tremendo.us
development and accomplishments of modern anthropology in general,
this may be dubbed a queer intellectual lag.
In building a sound ethnological jurisprudence it is necessary that
we have tools to work with that we may produce valid materials tot
work upon. The problem rests in the fact that the anthropologist has
not been supplied with good, sharp conceptual implements designed tot
handle lawstuff. Without such tools he runs the risk of b,,tching his
study of law-ways and judicial activities if he makes so bold as to run
the risk. It follows that few anthropologists have, to date, been inspired
tAssistant Professor of Anthropology and Sociology, New York University.
The author owes a debt of gratitude to Professors Karl X. Llewellyn, Max Radin,
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Cecil Headrick and John McConnell, for critical reading of the manuscript of this article.
1. The recent work by SE-A.GLE, THE OUTs'T For LAW (1941) offers the current
exemplification of the pattern. See cc. II & IV.
2. First published in 1861.
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to make the try. Exceptions there are, rare craftsmen with an intuitive
knack, who have turned in a full-bodied ethnological report of a primitive
people's legal behavior, and who have done it without much more than
a layman's knowledge of legal concepts. Barton was a school-teacher
in Luzon when he did the work that produced the Ifugao Law.3 Bruno
Gutmann was a missionary in Africa when he made the studies that
brought forth Das Recht der Dschagga True, Rattray was a lawyer
before, as an English colonial administrator, he did the Ashantiu- but
he was a case-trained lawyer. This last fact is important. The famous
German scholar in the field of ethnological jurisprudence, Professor
Joseph Kohler, was also a legalist before turning to ethnology. But
his legal background was that of theoretical systematism, and the result
of his prodigious efforts is a mountain of ethnological unreality.0 It is
small wonder that the Germans of the Kohler school made little impress
on either legal history and analysis or ethnological theory and method.
For an exceptional contrast to the Kohler futilities, one may consider
Wigmore's studies in primitive Japanese law.' Contemporary with
Kohler's earlier writings, Dean Wigmore's studies show the sturdy
solidity of a legal method applied to an anthropological problem when
that method is devised by a case-trained scholar of the law.
The question whether the law of primitive peoples is "true" law or
not, will not be discussed here. Professor Karl Llewellyn and the present
author have, in a recently published work, brought legal and anthro-
pological materials to bear upon the study of the Cheyenne Indian cul-
ture to demonstrate the worthwhileness of the study of primitive law
to effect a better understanding of civilized law.8 In an earlier study
of the Comanche Indians I suggested an "anthropological definition of
law" such as may be warranted by the facts as they exist in literate and
non-literate societies alike.0
This paper accepts the proposition that such anthropological data as,
are already collected demonstrate that there is significant legal behavior
among primitives: that there is law in primitive societies in the same
sense .as in ours. The thesis of this paper is that, this being so, the
3. BARTON, IFUGAO LAW (1919), 15 U. CAL. PUBL. Amr. ARcH. & Em. No. 1,
1-186; THE HALF-WAY SUN (1930) cc. III & VII; and PI1LIPItINE PAGANS: Tiia:
AUTOBIOGRAPHIES OF THREE IFUGAOS (1938).
4. GUTMANN, DAS RECHT DER DSCHAGGA (1926).
5. RATrRAY, ASHANTI LAW AND CONSTITUTION (1929).
6. See his numerous articles in the ZEITSCH. F. VERGLEICH. RECIITSWISSENSCIIAIT
beginning with vol. 3 (1892) to vol. 36 (1919).
7. See Wigmore, Notes on Land Tenure and Local Institutions in Old Japan (1891)
19 ASIATIC Soc. OF JAPAN 37.
8. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE-LAW IN
PRIMrIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
9. See Hoebel, The Political Organization and Law-vays of the Comanche Indians
(1940) Memoir 54, Am. ANTH. Assoc., 45-48.
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least common denominator of civilized law is the least common denorn-
inator of primitive law. The basic tools of the student of jurisprudence,
though originally designed to fit the needs of the student tf civilized law,
should therefore suitably serve the needs of the student of primitive
man. If this be true, then the anthropologist may find some of his tin.ls
for the study of primitive law ready-made and well designed in the
fundamental legal concepts of modern jurisprudence. It will then be-
hoove the anthropologist to attain the mastery of these fundamental
tools if he is to produce an ethnological jurisprudence that is sound and
adequate; and, what is more, the materials will then be communicatc(d
in a form that will be meaningful to the student of law.
It is, of course, true that neither courts, nor lawyers, nor jurisprudence
have all of them bothered to reduce their technical concepts to clear and
basic fundamentals. For, as Llewellyn so cogently put it, "legal usage
of technical words has sinned, and still does, in two respects; it is in-
volved in ambiguity of two kinds: multiple senses of the same term, and
terms too broad to be precise in application to the details of single
disputes. . . . No logician worth his salt would stand for it; no scientist
would stand for it."' 0
Yet it is a happy fact that the essential and fundamental legal con-
cepts have been reduced to simplicity, precision and universality in the
system advanced by Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld. Hlohfeld, modified,
provides at hand a set of accepted instruments which deserve rigrins
use in primitive jurisprudence."
10. LLEVELLYN, THE BRAMBLE Busn (1930) 3.
11. Professor Kocourek, one of Hohfeld's most rigorous critics, has recently written:
"After Hohfeld's death various attempts were made to subject the Hohfeld formula-
tion to critical consideration, and in one or two instances the critical findings were un-
favorable. On the whole, however, the weight of opinion in America, and perhaps, al-,,,
in England, accepts the Hohfeld formulation as logically correct and as practically
useful." The Century of Analytic Jurisprudence Since John Austin (1935) 2 J.AW-
A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 195, 207.
"With some variation in terms Hohfeld's analysis has found acceptance . . . [it]
has been taken over in the pending restatement of the law by the American Law Insti-
tute." LLEWELLYN. HohLfeld, WVesley Newcombe, 7 Em Yc. Soc. Scwi.'wcF t1932) 41).,
401.
"It professes . ..and, I think, successfully-to be able to reduce any legal transac-
tion, however complicated, to its actual constituent elements or atums." Radin, .1 Re-
statement of Hohfeld (1938) 51 H-smv. L. RE%. 1141, 1164.
"One of the greatest messages which [Hohfeld] . . . gave to the legal profession
was this, that an adequate analytical jurisprudence is an absolutely indispensable tool in
the equipment of the properly trained judge or lawyer-indispensable, that is, for the
highest efficiency in the discharge of the daily duties of his profession." Cook, Hoifcld's
Contributions to the Science of Law (1919) 28 YAL.E L. J. 721. "He demonstrated
its utility by many e.xmples from the law of contracts. torts, agency, property, etc.,
showing how the courts are constantly confronted by the neces4ity of distinuibing
between the eight concepts and are all too often confused by the lack of clear concepts
and precise terminology." Id. at 729.
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II.
The Hohfeldian analysis reduces all legal concepts to a minimum of
eight.1 2 These eight concepts pair off in mutually interdependent con-
verses so that there are conceived to be but four fundamental legal
relations, each representing a reciprocal condition existing between two
persons. These relations and the eight concepts are as follows:





Deinand-riqht means that A has a legal expectation that B behave in
a specific way with respect to A (in debt, B must pay A $100: this is
A's demand-right). Ditty means that B must behave in a specific way
with respect to A (in debt, B must pay A $100: this is B's duty).
Privilege-right means that A is free to behave in a certain way with
respect to B (A is free, as.against B, to sell Blackacre to X, Y, Z: this
is A's privilege-right). No-demand-right means that B has no legal
redress if A behaves in a certain specific way with respect to B (A is
free, as against B, to sell Blackacre to X, Y. Z: this is B's no-demand-
right).
Power means that A may voluntarily create a new legal relation affec-
ting B (if B makes an offer, A can close the contract: this is A's power).
Liability means that B is subject to a new legal relation voluntarily
created by A (if B makes an offer, A can close the contract: this v;
B's liability).
Inmmnity means that A is not subject to B's attempt voluntarily to
create a new legal relation affecting A (if B "sells" A's automobile,
it nevertheless remains A's auto: this is A's immunity). No-power
means that B may not voluntarily create a new legal relation affecting
12. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing (1913) 23 YALE L. J. 16; Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial
Reasoning (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 710. These essays and certain others by I-Iohfeld were
edited by Cook and published in book form: HoIFELD, FUNDAM NTAL LEGAL CoNcFr-
TIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTIIER LEGAL ESSAYS (1920). For
refinements of Hohfeld's concepts see Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology (1919)
29 YALE L. J. 163. See Radin, supra note 11 at 1163: "We may summarize by saying
that a restated Hohfeldian analysis may safely discard a great many of the detailed
terms that Hohfeld - rather tentatively - used, and even some which he apparently
regarded as of high importance. We may even-in fact we must-reject some of
the logical relationships he found in these terms . . . But the essentials of Holhfeld's
method make a workable scheme."
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A (if B "sells" A's automobile, it nevertheless remains .'s auto$: this
is B's no-power).
In all situations the important thing is never to forget that the legal
relation is identical, whether viewed from the position of A1 or of B.
The difference lies not in the relation, which is always two-sided, but
in the positions and outlook of A and B which together make up the
two converses entering into the relation. Thus if the analyst and his
readers are to grasp the Hohfeldian relation clearly, and are no t to 1ie
trapped into slips, then the relation must he so stated that the f.irm
of its language does not change one jot whether it expresses .A's rela-
tion to B or B's relation to A. This simple principle must not le
neglected.
For primitive law, especially, but also of valid importance for general
jurisprudence, are two additional points which ought to lie added to
the Hohfeldian doctrine. First, in any society one may expect to find
a series of sub-groups which taken together constitute the social
Entirety. Every single one of these sub-groups will have its own code
of "standards" and "norms" to set the patterns of behavior and to
control the activities of the members of the group with respect to each
other. Some of these standards may be found to have an imperative
quality for the membership of the sub-group under consideratio n. They
will, then, on the level of that sub-group have a quality which is sig-
nificantly similar to the "legal". The legal standards, it is generally
agreed, apply to the regulation of behavior of all persons within the
social Entirety. and the legal standards supersede the standards of any
and all sub-groups, if they are invoked. Many social complexities arise,
however, from the fact that the individual is at one and the same time
a member of sub-groups and of the social Entirety, and his legal rela-
tions on the separate levels of the two orders may be in sharp conflict.
To unravel the social (and legal) situation, the analyst must lie con-
sistently aware of the possibilities of non-consistency between the legal
relations on the law level and on the sub-group level. A religious
conscientious objector whose cult is not recognized by the Selective Ser-
vice Administration may well illustrate the conflict of duties (in the
Hohfeldian sense) imposed by the legal as against the religious im-
perative. Analogue after analogue will confront the investigator of the
primitives. Even within a supposedly well-ordered and consistent civil-
ized legal scheme the same pluralism is at hand to raise hob. When
Hohfeld "annihilated the classic theory that there was no conflict between
law and equity" 3 he had to worry over the problem of co-systems of
"law" involving the same persons. Hohfeld had to wrestle with the very
problem of the hierarchy of imperatives to which I have called attention.'4
13. SEAGLE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 400.
14. A much more thorough-going discusskiun tif ts lolenvmencun uf divere C levels
of law and sub-group patterns of interpersonal relatiuns is developed in LLEVux:Y SZ
19421
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The second additional point to which attention may well be called is
that Hohfeld's four fundamental legal relations are reducible into two
further categories. They are either active (positive) or passive (nega-
tive). Consideration of functions will show that the demand-right, duty
and the power, liability relations are active. On the strictly legal level
they are imperative relations subject to the coercive authority of the
courts and other recognized law-enforcing agencies.
The privilege-right, no-demand-right and the immunity, no-power
relations are passive. They are not in themselves subject to direct legal
enforcement. Rather, they set the limits of the law's activities, for they
do no more than define the types of behavior which the law itself declares
to be outside the scope of its sphere of control. Here the law hews
itself within the boundaries of its own concentration camp- often,
however, for positive purposes. Thus, civil liberties, though formally
negating law's interventions, serve positive purposes in the legal system
which "protects" them by negating legal interference.
If we speak of these passive relations as legal relations (as is ctis-
tomary), it is then only in the sense that our legal systems must make
declaratory decisions as to when specific forms of behavior fall into the
passive privilege-right, no-demand-right and the immunity, no-power
relations. Because, under our prevailing system, the majority of these
decisions are made by legal agencies, we are prone to call them "legal".
This leads to the common phrasing, "The Law is that A can sell Black-
acre to X, Y, Z," which is not quite right. An accurate phrasing would
have to be, "The Law says that A can sell Blackacre to X, Y, Z." Or
if one is to be accurately precise, as is imperative in legal and socio-
logical analysis, the statement should read, "The Law declares it is none
of its direct concern if A sells Blackacre to X, Y, Z." This distinction
is of vital importance, and it is much more than a matter of mere word-
age. It clarifies the relations of the individuals with respect to the law
and each other. When so put, no one will fail to recognize that the
passive legal relations are statements of "no-law."
For the study of primitive law this is especially important; it will
aid in dispelling the illusion that law and custom are one among primi-
tives. In our legal system every demand-right that A has upon B is
buttressed by accompanying demand-rights upon courts that they compel
B to perform his duty. In primitive society it may also be that there
are courts towards which A may have demand-rights in the event another
person violates his legal rights; this is the case when a system of "pub-
lic" law exists. But more commonly, there are no courts and no special-
ized law-enforcing agents. It will frequently happen that the aggrieved
HOEBEL, Op. cit. supra note 9, especially cc. VIII & XI. See also Llewellyn, The
Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method (1940)
49 YALE L. J. 1355.
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person himself, or his kinsmen, must enforce the individual's demand-
rights. If they do this in a socially recognized and generally accepted
manner, they have the legal privilege-right to apply the regular sanctions.
The difference, then, is this: in our system, a failure to meet a demand-
right by one party engenders a series of further demand-rights by the
aggrieved on the courts and law-enforcing agents that they compel per-
formance, or impose penalties; in primitive systems of "private" law,
a failure to meet a demand-right by one liarty engenders a privilege-
right in the aggrieved and his kin to compel performance, or impose
penalties, in a regularized manner.
III.
The most effective test of the usefulness of the Ilohfeldian funda-
mental legal concepts would be to apply the system of analysis to the
most vexatious problems of primitive law-the drawing of the real shape
of institutions said to be "communistic" as against "private", or to be
"corporeal" as against "incorporeal". These simple, all-embracing words
cover legal and social complexes; they are not fundamentals in them-
selves, and they easily become unsatisfactory substitutes for clear analysis
of the often exceedingly complex niceties of primitive legal institutions.
Much acrimonious argumentation can effectively be made unnecessary
by accurate and precise analysis, leaving the catch-all labels to the political
protagonist. They have no place in the social science of comparative
jurisprudence.
To this end, materials from the Yurok Indians of northern California
may be properly scrutinized with profit. The Yuroks are well known
ethnologically by virtue of the published works of Professor Kroeber,
whose writings also include some brief formal statements of Yurok law."'
The Yuroks live along the lower reaches of the Kiamath River and
the adjacent shores of the Pacific Coast where they subsist as a primitive
fishing and food-gathering people."0 Their world is a precise little affair,
a nicely knit cocoon which hems the Yuroks within the confines of their
river valley and a short stretch of the sea coast. They refuse to believe
15. Kroeber, Handbook of the Indians of California (1925) S.tlOllso. JIM.I I-.srJ-
TUTE. BuR.Au OF Am. ETHNOLOGY, BuLL. 78, p. 20; Yiurok Low (1922) 22 Ir. Co':v;.
oF AMERIcA-isTs 511.
16. Although the present tense is used in the descriptisn f the Yurolv, referen-e
is to usages such as prevailed up to the beginning of the present century. Social and
economic adjustments to the impact of American civilization have, of c.urse, wrought
changes in Yurok life. In the field of law the Yuroks are nkiw subject to the laws of
the State of California and of the Federal Government. The problem of "cunflict of
laws" as between the Yurok system, which still functions in part, and the state and
federal systems as they impinge upon the Yuroks would be an interesting separate
study.
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that there is a world beyond these limits, and within their known country
they define all identifiable geographical places with names and attributes
according to a traditional pattern. This is but one phase of a marked
conservative-mindedness and interest in status definition of all things and
persons. It may be expected, in view of their marked concern with
personal status, that, though the Yuroks have no formal government,
they will nevertheless exhibit a welter of legal relationships in the realm
of personal law.
Wealth, its accumulation and display, is an interest of the greatest
vitality for these people; tokens of wealth are strings of dentalium shell,
woodpecker scalps, and large ceremonial obsidian blades. There is sym-
bolic wealth in consumable goods, as well, but prestige comes from the
goods whose value is largely fiduciary. Property is therefore of extreme
importance as an instrument for the maintenance of personal status and
prestige.
In this setting every person, except bastards and slaves, has a full
quiver of demand-rights, privilege-rights, powers, and immunities which
he fits to his litigious bow on the slightest provocation. Though there
is no specialized law-enforcing personnel among the Yuroks, there is
nevertheless a regularized procedural technique for enforcing conform-
ance to the accepted legal standards. Enforcement is attained through
the imposition and collection of damages, or by the infliction of bodily
injury- even death-to the offender, for, as Kroeber has rightly ob-
served, "In the last analysis, violence to the body is the legal force
[imperative].' It is up to the aggrieved and his kinsmen to institute
the proceedings, as is usual in the private law of primitives, but they
do not themselves, in the case of the Yuroks, arraign the offender or
determine the extent of the damages to be assessed. This is done by
an informal court of go-betweens, or "crossers", who are chosen from
among non-relatives living in different communities from those of the
parties to the litigation. The plaintiff names two to four such persons,
and the defendant does likewise. Whatever these men decide will be
the judgment in the case. The crossers obtain evidence from the dis-
putants and any other available sources; they confer among themselves
as to what rules of substantive law apply, if any, to the case in hand;
they arrive at a verdict and then, if they have found him guilty, declare
an explicit judgment against the defendant. Thus, when the crossers
find against the defendant, they sustain the plaintiff's claim as a valid
demand-right, for the defendant has been found derelict in his duty;
the judgment assesses him with customary damages which must be paid
to the plaintiff. In default, the defendant must become the plaintiff's
debtor-slave, or his execution by the plaintiff and his kin will be war-
17. In seminar discussion, see note 18 infra.
[Vol. 51 : 951
LEGAL CONCEPTS IN PRIMITIVE LAW
ranted. There is risk in this of engendering a feud, though public opinion
will support the plaintiff in his action. Each side fees his crossers with
a dentalium shell, a fee which is euphemistically known as "his nitc-
cassin"! It literally compensates for the footwork involved in adjudi-
cating the case.
In fixing damages, the crossers are guided by well-established prin-
ciples of value. Except for the above-mentioned bastards and slaves,
who have no legab rights, every person has a fixed and immutable
wergild, every material object its fixed worth determined by what has
been paid for it in previous economic transactions, and every intangible
property-right has its customarily recognized valuation. Bride-purchase,
which alone makes a marriage valid, determines wergild, for the laga
of a person is the equivalent of what one's father paid for his wife -
that person's mother. Bastards have no wergild for the simple reas mn
that no bride-price was paid for their mothers. In consequence, they
have no legal status whatever. This fact is true in theory and in prac-
tice, for such persons have no father's kin to support them, while their
mother's kin are ashamed to come forward for them. In addition to
being legally without laga, they are social pariahs, a living affrn t to
the Yurok sensibilities of 
social decency.
Injury to the person is scaled in accordance with the seriousness of
the trespass and the wergild evaluation of the aggrieved. Legal relations
of many interesting sorts enter into the law of persons. A few examples
put into Hohfeldian terms will be to the point."'
The first case arises out of the broad conception of contributory
negligence held by the Yuroks. The first factor is that locations which
are most favorable as fishing sites along the banks of the Klamath
river are subject to private ownership. The holder of the hereditary
title to a fishing spot enjoys, as against any other person, the privilege-
right to exclusive use of the location. He possesses the power, however,
to extend a temporary privilege-right to any second party to fish from
his private locus. Extension of such a privilege-right to a stranger
carries with it a duty on the part of the owner to see that no injury
befalls his guest. Failure to do so is held by the Yuroks to be negli-
gence; should the guest have the misfortune to slip on a rock while fish-
ing from his host's territory, suffering injury thereby, lie has a legitimate
demand-right for damages against his host arising out of his original
demand-right that the owner protect him from injury.
In a similar vein, Kroeber recorded a case in which a visitor to three
brothers went sea-lion hunting while lie was yet their guest. The venture
18. All the Yurok case materials to follow were presented by Professor Kroaber il
his discussion of Yurok culture before the joint seminar (anthropology and psychologyI
on Psychological Approaches to Culture, The University of California, in the qiring
of 1941.
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ended disastrously; he drowned. The dead man's kin demanded damages
equivalent to the full homicide wergild. The three brothers denied the
claim as invalid, refusing thereby to acknowledge a duty. Crossers were
then selected to take testimony, state the law, and give judgment. Testi-
mony established evidence that the brothers had invited the deceased to
stay overnight with them. In Yurok law this imposed a duty to safe-
guard the well-being of their guest. It was further established that the
drowning occurred offshore from the very beach which was privately
owned by the three brothers. This was held to impose a parallel duty
to safeguard the guest. The brothers were judged guilty of negligence
on these two counts, and the crossers awarded full wergild to the kin
of the deceased.
Land ownership involves not only powers and privilege-rights for the
title holder, but unique and interesting duties as well. Another case,
recorded by Kroeber as having occurred some eighty years ago, reveals
further aspects of Yurok legal relations with respect to property. In
this instance, the family of which M was headman did not own the
beach as such but possessed the long-established demand-right that the
flippers of all sea lions caught along the Pacific coast for a distance
of about four miles in either direction from their settlement be given
to them. A hunter, named L, disregarded his duty in this relation on
several occasions. M, instead of taking legal steps, brooded, and finally
assaulted the father of L, wounding him with an arrow. The family
of L took action for assault-damages. Crossers handled the case in the
regular manner. Their verdict was that the damages sustained by virtue
of the wounding were slightly less than the damages arising from the
violation of the M family's demand-right for the sea-lion flippers. Ergo,
the L family's claim was nullified. The affair was thus res judicata;
but, though adjudicated, the sense of grievance was not washed out.
As so often happens, when legalism outweighs juristic method, the law
served only its standards and did not deal with the social problem."0 Thus,
L nursed his sense of grievance, and, two days after the legal settlement,
he cursed M. To lay a curse is prohibited by Yurok law, and on this
basis M entered a claim for damages against L for violation of his duty
to refrain from cursing. Crossers were at work on the case when hot-
headed relatives of M murdered L. The sister of L cursed the killers,
and this time it was her privilege-right to retaliate. But with greater
effect L's mother entered a claim to have transferred to her the hereditary
demand-right on sea-lion flippers as equivalent to her son's wergild.
She won the award.
The examples thus far presented are thought to show two things.
First, that the presentation of primitive material by way of the lHob-
19. See LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, op. cit. supra note 8, at 45.
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feldian concepts is feasible. Second, and better, that such presentation
sharpens perception of the cases, the issues, and their inore precise bear-
ings and limits in law.
The demonstration of a third point may now be attempted: that un-
necessary controversy and confusion engendered by the use of labels
which are over-broad or inapplicable may be avoided by substitutiin of
Hohfeldian analysis.
One of the fields of skirmish between the collectivist and the indi-
vidualistically-minded anthropologists has been the identification of cer-
tain primitive property forms as either "private" or "communal". Iegal
writers have also entered into the fray, as for instance the recent casti-
gation of Bronislaw Malinowski by William Seagle, with the assertion
that Professor Mfalinowski is guilty of attacking primitive communism
"with evidence from a communistic people."112 0 This, because Malinowski
undertook to demonstrate that canoe ownership in Melanesia is not the
subject of common ownership, as had been maintained by the late English
anthropologist, W V. H. R. Rivers. 1 In his famous study of law in the
Trobriand Islands, Malinowski takes pains to show that Trobriand can, ,e
ownership, as an exemplification of Melanesian practices, is certainly
not communism, but an intricate complex of individual "duties, privi-
leges and benefits."2 2 Malinowski was completely right in his conclusions
that "ownership . . . can be defined neither by such words as 'coni-
munism', nor 'individualism', nor by reference to 'joint-stock company'
system or 'personal enterprise', but by the concrete facts and conditions
of use. It is the sum of duties, privileges and mutualities which bind
the joint owners to the object and to each other."23 In this he is very
close to the Hohfeldian type of thinking and terminology. It seems
likely that if his case had been put explicitly in Hohfeldian fundamental
terms, his comprehensive grasp of the nature of property forms in primi-
tive Melanesian society could not be grossly misconstrued, especially
not by a student of law. For if a complex legal and social institution
is reduced in clarity to its fundamental components, the vagary of gross
catch-all concepts is banished. Confusion and useless argunentation
go out with the catch-alls, for it is in the periphery of their fuzzy
boundaries that all the fighting occurs.
Thus, as the Yurok materials are given further consideration, the
question of canoe ownership among this people is best handled without
reference to communism or private property. A Yurok boat-owner
nominally "owns" his boat, but "ownership", as always, is a compound
especially of demand-right, duty and privilege-right, no-demand-right
20. SEAGLE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 53.
21. RItwas, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (1924) 106-07.
22. MALINowsKI. CIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE: SOCiEIV (1926) 17-21.
23. Id. at 20-21.
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relations. The "owner" has a series of demand-rights against any other
person that such other person not molest or damage his boat. He
has the privilege-right against any other person to use it upon the public
waters and a general immunity from obligation by way of mere offers
to buy, though he has the power to sell it or bestow it as a gift. These
are all marks of private ownership. (Such an immunity, however, is
not enjoyed in every primitive culture, especially where exchange oper-
ates chiefly by "gift" and "return-gift".)24 Yet he is also subject to a
series of well-recognized duties which certainly limit his exclusive pre-
rogative over the object. For one thing, he is under a duty to respond
to the demand-right of any cross-country traveller that the canoe-owner
ferry him across the river when called upon. Failure to do so gives
rise to a demand-right for damages on the part of the traveller. Damages
equal one dentalium shell. However, in balance with this duty of the
canoe-owner - and in direct contrast with the situation where an owner's
guest is concerned - it is the passenger's duty to assume responsibility
for any injury suffered by the owner in consequence of service he is
rendering. In consequence of this, a boat-owner whose house took fire
and burned while he was engaged in ferrying a passenger, enjoyed a
demand-right for full damages to be paid by his passenger."
Our analysis of these examples from primitive societies leads us to
concur with Professor Cook's admirable formulation of the nature of
ownership as based on Roman and Anglo-American law. It would seem
that the following statement from Cook is aptly tailored to suit the data
we have been just analyzing:
"The assertion that a person owns an object is a summary way of
stating that he has an exceedingly complex aggregate of legal rights
which relate to the object, and indirectly that all the facts necessary
to give him these rights exist. This may be expressed by saying that
the word ownership denotes such an aggregate of rights and con-
notes the existence of the facts which give rise to the rights. When
the aggregate of rights denoted by ownership is analyzed, it is found
to consist not only of an indefinite number of rights in the strict
sense or claims available against an indefinite number of persons,
each of whom is under a corresponding duty, but also of a large
and indefinite number of privileges, powers and immunities, in the
senses in which these terms are employed in the system of Hohfeld.
The number of such claims, privileges, powers and immunities
changes consistently as persons are born, become old enough to
owe legal duties and die; they may vary also with the occurrence
of other events."
'26
24. See Wardle, Gifts, Primitive 6 ENcyc. Soc. SciENcEs (1931) 657.
25. See Kroeber, supra note 15, at 35.
26. Cook, Owntership and Possession (1933) 11 ENCYC. Soc. SCIPNCIS (1933) 521.
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With such conceptions in mind it is not difficult to deal with the
question of the existence of incorporeal property in primitive society,
as well as tangible chattels. This subject first received anthropological
attention in the writings of Professor Lowie, -7 who contends that the
notion of legal historians that incorporeal property is the result of ad-
vanced legal sophistication is a rationalistic prejudice belied by the data
from primitive societies.
Professor Lowie's interpretation of certain primitive data as evidence
of the existence of incorporeal property rights am tng primitives has
also been sharply challenged by Seagle. -8 Seagle denies that the incor-
poreal rights of primitives are property in any sense, "the concept of
possession' rather than ownership is far more suitable in describing the
primitive institution. '2 9 The rights in question, as he sees them, are
not property, because they are no more than extensions of the person;
they are a part of the person and hence cannot be properties in the legal
sense. Seagle contends on these grounds that "it remains true to say
that early law is hostile to incorporeal rights."30
We may apply the Hohfeldian analysis as a precipitant for these
muddy waters. Taking the concept of ownership made explicit in the
words of Cook, may we not usefully say that property is any object,
tangible or intangible, whicl is the subject of ownership? Now pick up
the examples of incorporeal property advanced by Lowie and see if they
may be properly treated as objects of ownership.
An Andaman Islander composes a song for the LOccasion of a tribal
gathering, a song that is received with applause. Irrespective of its
popularity no one dares sing it except the composer himself.3 ' We are not
told what happens in the event someone presumes to sing the song of
another, and, in consequence, it is impossible to know on just what level
of social control the incorporeal right to songs among the Andamanese
exists.
Among the further examples set forth by Professor Luwie is the
private ownership of songs, incantations, prayers, and magical formulas.
Verbal patterns of supernatural importance are subject to sale and gift.
The owner in some of the instances cited may cumpletely alienate his
property, or may sell or give no more than a limited interest in it, retain-
ing the right to use the song or formula while extending a similar right
to the recipient.
27. Lowie, Incorporeal Properly in Prinmthve Society (1928) 37 Y,%LE L. J. 551,
and in his Pnrxv Soci=r (1920) at 235-43.
28. SEAGLE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 50-54.
29. Id. at 51.
30. Id. at 52.
31. LowiE, PRIPlvTvE Socia'v (1920) 236.
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So long, of course, as any other aspects there may be are not arti-
ficially eliminated from notice, there is no evidence at hand of any legal
procedures for setting a legal claim against usurpers of incorporeal
property rights of this order just described. There is no evidence that
damages are claimed or that punitive penalties may be imposed by the
aggrieved or that they will be imposed by any representative of the
society or that they are ever the subject of litigation in primitive courts
of law. On this point, however, the negative evidence is hardly im-
pressive, unless such evidence has first been expressly sought, because
the little extant data concerning the actual subjects of litigation in prinii-
tive disputes have been to date for the most part culled without special
inquiry. What we do learn and know is that trespass on these incorporeal
rights of a supernatural nature brings supernatural punishments in its
train. The sanctions protecting these forms of rights are apparently
magico-religious rather than strictly legal. Yet the beauty of I-Iohfeldian
analysis, and this is not yet realized in social and legal science, is that
the Hohfeldian relationships can be used to make other-than-legal social
relationships clear.3
Thus, consider the case of a Plains Indian visionary who has fasted
and sought supernatural power. A bear appeared to him in a dream;
it spoke to him and taught him four new songs. It also instructed him
in the preparation of a rawhide shield to be painted with a bear symbol
and other devices. The bear in the vision also instructed his tutelary
that a shield made in accordance with the instructions provides immunity
in battle if the four songs are sung before an engagement begins. The
visionary has made a shield as instructed; he has sung the songs; his
comrades have heard the words; and he has deliberately exposed him-
self to the missiles of the enemy, coming through unscathed. The value
of the shield and the songs has been publicly demonstrated. The shield,
as Professor Lowie has made clear, is a material object which is clearly
personal property. But the shield as such, in the culture of the Plains
Indians, is of little value. What is of value in conjunction with the
shield are the songs and the mystic power which the two engender to-
gether. The incorporeal property is the thing of worth. The complex
of shield, song, and power may be transferred as a gift to son, nephew,
brother or friend (in at least one Comanche case which I recorded,33 the
transfer had to be followed by a vision on the part of the recipient before
the mystic power would become operative, however, and this may fre-
quently be the case among other tribes). Or, this same complex may
be sold in a commercial transaction which has the qualities of contractual
32. I am indebted to Karl Llewellyn for initial elucidation of this point in discussion
and conversation.
33. See Hoebel, supra note 9, at 860.
[Vol. 51: 951
LEGAL CONCEPTS IN PRIMITIVE LAW
sale. In either case, the recipient may use the complex, if he has prolperly
acquired the rights through regularized transfer, but not otherwise. The
consequence of unauthorized use of the shield and songs is that the
usurper will most certainly be killed by eneny missiles, due to the puni-
tive action of the supernatural power. But there is no reason to believe
that the true owner may not recover the shield, if it is stulen, and with
it his enjoyment of the songs.
In Hohfeldian terms, all this means simply that the owner of a vision
complex can sing its songs and possess its distinctive paraphernalia, and
others cannot: this is his privilege-right against any other person. Fromn
the standpoint of other warriors in the tribe it mean,- that ,I alone can
sing its songs and possess its distinctive paraphernalia, and B (cor any
other person) cannot: this is B's duty. But B's duty does not give
grounds for a legal claim on A's part in the event of violation; rather,
B's duty exists with respect to the supernatural order, not the si-ocietal
(legal). This form of statement assumes the supernatural pi-owers too
be no part of the legal order. But the fact is, in many primitive cul-
tures they can more properly be viewed as sanctioning officials, operating,
so to speak, in "equity" when the "common law" of the secular gives
no remedy, or even is supposed not to. If we gi further, we can say
that A can give away the entire complex; this is A's power. Suppose
A is free, as against his family, to give it to, a non-relative; his son, X,
cannot prevent him from so doing; this is X's no-power. R offers to
give three horses for the complex. A can close the deal; this is A's
power. Again, B offers to give three horses for the complex. .A can
close this deal: this is B's liability. Further, B offers three horses for the
complex; A can reject the offer: this is A's immunity. Or, again with
respect to this offer and A's rejection of it: this is B's nl-power. But
in some cultures (e.g., the Cheyenne) A cannot well be said t be free
to reject the offer. In such a culture A hlds the complex with power
in various other persons to force him to alienation by such an offer. His
.ownership" is accompanied by liabilities to, involuntary alienation.
Do we not have here a sufficiently large ag regate of rights denoted
by ownership "[which consists] not only of an indefinite number if
rights in the strict sense or claims available against an indefinite num-
ber of persons, each of whom is under a corresponding duty, but also
a large and indefinite number of privileges, powers and immunities
" so that one may properly speak of incorporeal property in these
matters?
An Hohfeldian analysis makes this unambiguously clear. And, lest
the reader fail to note it, he should observe that the Hohfeldian analysis
has just been used in the exposition of a social institution which turns
out to be not even a "legal" institution (according to the ideas of
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the orthodox). This is possible because Hohfeld's fundamental concepts
are more universal than even their inventor himself realized. They fit
not only the fundamental legal relations, but also the fundamentals of
any complex of imperative social reciprocity. Thus, even were we to
grant that a social relation must be recognized by courts and enforced
by political agents to be legal, even though we were to accept the idea
that social relations enforced by supernatural sanctions are not primarily
legal, still, the Hohfeldian system may be applicable to a useful classi-
fication of such an other-than-legal complex as incorporeal property
among primitives.
Above all, in the use of Hohfeldian fundamental concepts, for lawyer
and anthropologist alike, "thinking thus, in nicer terms, with nicer tools
of thought, you pull the issue into clarity . . . unambiguously, because
your terms are not ambiguous." 4
It is submitted, then, that here are tools for the anthropologist to use
when once he has assembled his body of case materials; for the study of
primitive law, like that of the common law, must draw its generalizations
from particulars, which are cases, cases and more cases- cases to be
dissected and analyzed into their principles. Dissecting tools are needed
for the job, whatever type of law system is being studied, for as the
late Justice Cardozo counselled, "Cases do not unfold themselves for the
asking. They yield up their kernel slowly and painfully.'3a "We do
not pick our rules of law full blossomed from the trees." 30 But the
yield is rich, and can be much richer, even in the primitive field, and
the investigation of primitive law need not be too painful if there be
sound techniques with which to handle the materials.
34. Llewellyn, op. cit. supra note 11, at 88.
35. CARDozo, THE NATuR, OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 29.
36. Id. at 103.
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